Mon Jan 1, 0001

ShotSpotter, Border Device Searches, and Fusion Centers

ShotSpotter / SoundThinking

Deployment

~150+ US cities at peak. Rebranded from ShotSpotter to SoundThinking (2023).

How It Works

Acoustic sensors (mounted on buildings/poles) detect impulsive sounds consistent with gunfire. Multiple sensors triangulate location via time-of-arrival differences. Alerts sent to review center where analysts classify sound before forwarding to police (30-60 seconds).

False Positive Rate

  • MacArthur Justice Center (2021, Chicago data): 89% of alerts led to police finding no evidence of gunfire or gun crime
  • Chicago OIG (August 2021): 86% of dispatches resulted in no incident report of gun-related offense
  • SoundThinking disputes: “no evidence found” does not equal “false positive”

Chicago

Deployed ~2017-2018, expanded under Mayor Lightfoot. Mayor Brandon Johnson did not renew ~$49 million contract. System deactivated September 2024.

AP / MacArthur Findings

AP (2021): technology rarely led to cases solved. MacArthur: alerts disproportionately sent police into Black and Latino neighborhoods with no confirmed gunfire.

Ambient Audio

Sensors always listening. Company states only short clips (few seconds) triggered by loud impulsive sounds. However: People v. Michael Williams (Cook County, 2021) — ShotSpotter alert reclassified from “firework” to “gunshot” after police requested review. Case eventually dropped.

Deployment Disparity

Sensors overwhelmingly in predominantly Black and Hispanic neighborhoods.

Border Search Exception for Electronics

Authority

Border search exception (United States v. Ramsey, 1977): CBP may search persons and belongings at border without warrant or probable cause.

Volume

CBP: ~37,000 device searches in FY2022 (out of hundreds of millions of crossings).

Key Cases

Alasaad v. McAleenan (D. Mass. 2019) Judge Casper: forensic/advanced device searches require reasonable suspicion. Manual/basic searches (scrolling through content) do not. Partially upheld on appeal: Alasaad v. Mayorkas (1st Cir. 2021) held reasonable suspicion required for BOTH basic and advanced searches.

United States v. Cotterman (9th Cir. 2013, en banc) Forensic laptop examination at border requires reasonable suspicion.

CBP Directive (2018)

Distinguishes “basic” (manual inspection) from “advanced” (connecting external equipment) searches. Advanced requires reasonable suspicion per policy.

Refusal to Unlock

CBP cannot compel US citizens to unlock devices but can seize and detain device. Non-citizens may face denial of entry.

Fusion Centers

Scale

80 recognized fusion centers nationwide (DHS, 2022). Primary and recognized centers. Established post-9/11.

Funding

DHS Homeland Security Grant Program: $1.4+ billion cumulative.

Senate Report (2012)

Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Coburn report): examined 13 months of reporting. Found fusion centers produced “irrelevant, useless, or inappropriate intelligence reporting” including reports violating civil liberties. DHS could not account for $1.4 billion spent.

Documented Overreach

  • Monitored Occupy Wall Street protesters (2011-2012), coordination between DHS and local police
  • ACLU documented monitoring of journalists, peace activists, Ron Paul supporters
  • Missouri Information Analysis Center (MIAC, 2009): report flagging supporters of third-party candidates and certain bumper stickers as potential militia threats. Retracted after public outcry.
  • Virginia fusion center monitored political rallies at historically Black universities (documented via FOIA)

Sources

  • MacArthur Justice Center (2021)
  • Chicago OIG (August 2021)
  • AP reporting on ShotSpotter (2021)
  • Alasaad v. McAleenan (D. Mass. 2019)
  • Alasaad v. Mayorkas (1st Cir. 2021)
  • United States v. Cotterman (9th Cir. 2013)
  • Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2012)